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Professor Callister explains the criticisms of technology and modern life proffered by German philosopher Martin Heidegger. He applies the criticisms to
the current legal information environment and contrasts developing technologies and current attitudes and practices with earlier Anglo‑American traditions. Finally, he considers the implications for law librarianship in the current
information environment.
POOR librarians. Soon, no doubt, to go the way of blacksmiths and town criers, their
chosen field made obsolete by Internet search engines and self-perpetuating electronic
databases.1

¶1 Following World War II, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger offered
one of the most potent criticisms of technology and modern life. His nightmare is
a world whose essence has been reduced to the functional equivalent of “a giant
gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry. This relation of man to the world [is] in principle a technical one. . . . [It is] altogether alien
to former ages and histories.”2 For Heidegger, the problem is not technology itself,
but the technical mode of thinking that has accompanied it. Such a viewpoint of
the world is a useful paradigm to consider humanity’s relationship to law in the
current information environment, which is increasingly technical in Heidegger’s
sense of the term.
¶2 Heidegger’s warning that a technical approach to thinking about the world
obscures its true essence is directly applicable to the effects of the current (as well
as former) information technologies that provide access to law. The thesis of this
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article is that Heidegger provides an escape, not only for libraries threatened by
obsolescence by emerging technologies, but for the law itself, which is under the
same risk of subjugation. This article explains the nature of Heidegger’s criticisms
of technology and modern life, and explores the threat specifically identified by
such criticism, including an illustration based upon systematic revision of law
in Nazi Germany. It applies Heidegger’s criticisms to the current legal information environment and contrasts developing technologies and current attitudes and
practices with earlier Anglo-American traditions. Finally, the article considers the
implications for law librarianship in the current information environment.

Heidegger’s Nightmare: Understanding the Beast
Calculative Thinking and the Danger of Subjugation to a Single Will
¶3 The threat is not technology itself; it is rather a danger based in the essence of

thinking, which Heidegger describes as “enframing”3 or “calculative thinking.”4
For Heidegger, the problem is that mankind misconstrues the nature of technology
as simply “a means to an end.”5
¶4 Heidegger’s articulation of the common conception of technology as a
“means” applies equally well to information technologies, including legal databases. True, it is hard to think of technology in any other way, but what Heidegger
argues is that this failure to consider the essence of technology is a threat to
humanity.6
¶5 He defines the threat in two ways. First, humans become incapable of seeing anything around them as but things to be brought into readiness to serve some
end (a concept he refers to as “standing reserve”).7 They are thereby cut off from
understanding the essence of things and, consequently, their surrounding world.8
Second, man is reduced to the role of “order-er” of things, specifically to some
purpose or end, and, as a result, risks becoming something to be ordered as well.9

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

8.

9.

See William Lovitt, Introduction to Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology
and Other Essays, at xxix (Willliam Lovitt trans., 1977).
Heidegger, supra note 2, at 46.
See Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in The Question Concerning
Technology and Other Essays, supra note 3, at 4–5 (“Technology is a means to an end.”).
See infra ¶¶ 11–17 for an example of how Nazism reduced humanity to a thing to be ordered.
See Lovitt, supra note 3, at xxix (“Today all things are being swept together into a vast network in
which their only meaning lies in their being available to serve some end that will itself also be directed
toward getting everything under control. Heidegger calls this fundamentally undifferentiated supply
of the available the ‘standing reserve.’”).
See Heidegger, supra note 3, at 28 (“The rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that
it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a
more primal truth.”).
Id. at 26–27 (“As soon as . . . man . . . is nothing but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes
to the very brink of a precipitous fall; that is he comes to the point where he himself will have to be
taken as standing-reserve.”).
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Heidegger illustrates these concerns as follows:
The forester who, in the wood, measures the felled timber and to all appearances walks
the same forest path in the same way as did his grandfather is today commanded by profitmaking in the lumber industry, whether he knows it or not. He is made subordinate to the
orderability of cellulose, which for its part is challenged forth by the need for paper, which
is then delivered to newspapers and illustrated magazines. The latter, in their turn, set public opinion to swallowing what is printed, so that a set configuration of opinion becomes
available on demand.10

In other words, the trees, the wood, the paper, and even the forester (whose ancestors once understood the sanctity of the woods) are ultimately subordinated to the
will to establish orderly public opinion. The forester, in proverbial fashion, “cannot see the forest for the trees.” Instead of appreciating the majesty and mystery
of the living forest, he sees only fodder for the paper mill, which will pay for his
next meal.
¶6 The same cynicism might be applied to legal publishing. Whole forests have
given their lives to the publication of legal information in order to provide a stable
basis for society—after all, the “law must be stable and yet it cannot stand still,”11
or as our comrades from Critical Legal Studies might put it, law is simply a tool “to
perpetuate the existing socioeconomic status quo.”12 Cadres of West editors (commonly referred to in generic fashion as human resources, ironically making them
all the less human)13 work feverishly to digest points of law and assign 55,000
cases into a taxonomy with more than 100,000 class distinctions,14 all for the sake
of a predictable legal system and stable society.
¶7 For Heidegger, the threat is revealed in mankind’s perpetual quest to gain
mastery over technology. “Everything depends on our manipulating technology in
the proper manner as a means. We will, as we say, ‘get’ technology ‘spiritually in

10.
11.
12.

13.

14.

Id. at 18. Heidegger finds that man “never is transformed into mere standing-reserve” because of his
unique position as the “order-er” of everything else. Id.
Roscoe Pound, Interpretations of Legal History 1 (1923).
Black’s Law Dictionary 382 (Bryan A. Garner ed., 7th ed., 1999). For a more thorough definition
of Critical Legal Studies, see John Henry Schlegel, Critical Legal Studies, in Oxford Companion to
American Law 202 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2002).
See Heidegger, supra note 3, at 18 (“If man is challenged, ordered, to do this, then does not man
himself belong even more originally than nature within the standing-reserve? The current talk about
human resources, about the supply of patients for a clinic, gives evidence of this.”).
See Paul Douglas Callister, Beyond Training: Law Librarianship’s Quest for the Pedagogy of Legal
Research Education, 95 Law Libr. J. 7, 21, 2003 Law Libr. J. 1, ¶ 33 (estimating number of cases
published annually by West in print); Dan Dabney, The Universe of Thinkable Thoughts: Literary
Warrant and West’s Key Number System, 99 Law Libr. J. 229, 236, 2007 Law Libr. J.14, ¶ 33 (estimating number of lines in West classification system). Interestingly, Dabney has recently expressed
concern that large systems such as the West Topic and Key Number System are limited in effectiveness to their current 100,000 classes. See Dan Dabney, A Brief Practical Introduction to Taxonomies
7 (Thompson Legal Knowledge and Trends White Paper, n.d.). Apparently, humanity’s role as the
order-er of things is “at capacity,” and is, presumably, in need of technological replacement. See
Heidegger, supra note 3, at 18.
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hand.’ We will master it. The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more
technology threatens to slip from human control.”15 When Heidegger published
these words (first in 1962, but based on lectures from 1949 and 1950),16 the implications of nuclear energy and atomic warfare occupied much academic discussion.
Heidegger points out that the popular question of this period did not concern how
to find sufficient energy resources, but “[i]n what way can we tame and direct the
unimaginably vast amounts of atomic energies, and so secure mankind against the
danger that these gigantic energies suddenly—even without military actions—
break out somewhere, ‘run away’ and destroy everything?”17 The modern question
is about our mastery over technology, not about sufficiency of resources.
¶8 Similar concerns are apparent with respect to information technologies,
where the primary problem is not lack of access, but too much access: for example,
illegal music file swapping,18 the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA),19 and trends to use licensing to control and
preserve the economic value of information (and to prohibit otherwise lawfully
competitive practices, such as reverse engineering).20 With respect to law and
government, we see such examples as retraction of government documents,21 the
Patriot Act,22 the furor over unpublished electronic precedent,23 and the recent

15.
16.
17.
18.

19.
20.

21.

22.

23.

Heidegger, supra note 3, at 5.
Lovitt, supra note 3, at ix.
Heidegger, supra note 2, at 51.
See, e.g., David Shepardson, Sony, Others Sue 9 U-M Downloaders; Record Companies Accuse
Students of Taking Music Illegally, Detroit News, Apr. 2, 2004, at 1D, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Detroit News File.
17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)–(b) (2000).
Compare Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005) (end-user license agreement
validly prohibited reverse-engineering even when copyright law may have permitted it) with Sony
Computer Entm’t, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (reverse-engineering permitted under fair use when no end-user license agreement restrictions banning the practice were an issue
in the case).
See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, Statement on Request to Withdraw USGS
Source-Water CD-Rom from Depository Libraries (Jan. 16, 2002), available at http://www.access.
gpo.gov/public-affairs/news/02news04.html.
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 18, 50, and other titles of U.S.C.); USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (codified in scattered
sections of 18, 50, and other titles of U.S.C.).
See Molly McDonough, Door Slowly Opens for Unpublished Opinions, A.B.A. J. e-Report, Apr. 21,
2006 (“Judges and lawyers opposed to the [Supreme Court rule permitting citation of unpublished
opinions] have referred to unpublished opinions as ‘junk law.’ They flooded the advisory committee
with some 500 letters opposing the citation rule.”); Stephanie Francis Ward, Giving Their Opinions:
Committee Backs Rule Allowing Lawyers to Cite Unpublished Decisions, A.B.A. J. e-Report, Apr.
23, 2004 (quoting federal Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski: “Given the press of our cases, especially screening cases, we simply do not have the time to shape and edit unpublished dispositions
to make them safe as precedent.”); Paul Marcotte, Unpublished but Influential: With Technology,
Opinions Not in the Law Books Can Be Misused, Critics Charge, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1991, at 26, 26
(“[Lauren] Robel fears, for example, that bar groups and scholars will be unable to discern trends in
case law covering federal agency decision-making because of the growing numbers of unpublished
opinions.”).
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frenzy of e-discovery.24 Some stakeholders seem to have liked things better when
information resources were scarce.25 Universal access is destabilizing—hence, the
considerable interest in getting a “handle” on technology through legal sanction
and yet additional technological innovation (the so-called “access control” technologies).26
¶9 Heidegger’s genius is in recognizing that all the fuss about mastering technologies, although close to the mark, concerns the wrong issue. The more insidious threat is not nuclear fallout or economic devaluation of intellectual property,
but the worldview of “calculative” thinking that accompanies rapid technological change: “The world now appears as an object open to attacks of calculative
thought, attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist.”27 For Heidegger,
calculative thought is not limited to the manipulation of machine code or numbers.

24.

25.

		

26.

27.

See, e.g., Carolyn Southerland, Ignorance of IT Minutiae No Excuse for Litigators, 28 Nat’l L.J., July
17, 2006, at S3; Kristin M. Nimsger & Michele C. S. Lange, E is for Evidence: Examining Recent EDiscovery Developments, GPSolo, Mar. 2006, at 40, available at http://www.abanet.org/genpractice/
magazine/2006/mar/scitech.html; James M. (Duke) Johnston Jr. & Philip A. Whistler, E-Discovery:
A Critical Litigation Issue for Franchisors and Franchisees, 26 Franchise L.J. 20 (2006); Marianne
Tolomeo & Brett Kuller, Litigation Strategies In Light of Document Retention Requirements for
Electronic Records, Trial Prac., Fall 2005, at 6; David K. Isom, Electronic Discovery: New Power,
New Risks, Utah B.J., Nov. 2003, at 8.
The issue is perhaps discomfort with the pace of technological change (specifically the speed and
accuracy of the Internet) and its impact on entertainment industries. See, e.g., Privacy and Piracy:
The Paradox of Illegal File Sharing on Peer-to-Peer Networks and the Impact of the Technology on
the Entertainment Industry: Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S.
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 18 (2003), available at http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/
shrg108275privacy_piracy.pdf (testimony of Jack Valenti, President & CEO, Motion Picture
Association of America) (“If we just stopped [development of broadband Internet] right now, if the
world just stopped, we would be doing fine because we [the motion picture industry] could survive
it.”). Valenti was particularly concerned about the future speed of the Internet:
Scientists at CalTech have announced “FAST,” an experimental program that can download a
DVD quality movie in five seconds! . . . Can anyone deny that these huge download speeds
brood over our future? Can anyone deny that when one can upload and download movies in
seconds or minutes the rush to illegally obtain films will reach “pandemic stage?”
Id. at 91–92 (prepared statement of Jack Valenti) (emphasis added).
Perhaps, the real problem is a lack of scarcity or “friction” in the new technologies—they are
simply too accurate and fast. See Siva Vaidhyanathan, The Anarchist in the Library: How the
Clash Between Freedom and Control is Hacking the Real World and Crashing the System,
at xi (2004) (discussing “how we could install ‘friction’ into an otherwise unregulated medium; about
how closely we should try to make cyberspace conform to and resemble the analog world”); see also
id. at xiii (“The collapse of inconvenience has sparked a series of efforts that could reestablish the
distance, or friction, that our information systems have featured since the rise of moveable type and
bound books.”); id. at 13 (explaining the theory postulated in Robert Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy
(2000), “that the stable comfort of the modern nation-state is doomed because too many dangerous
goods, services, and ideas can flow too easily without traditional regard for authority and tradition”);
id. at 87 (“The fundamental purpose of intellectual property law is to create artificial scarcity.”).
“Despite the obvious futility of anti-piracy efforts, governments throughout the world are shifting
to the technological regulation of distribution from the human to the technological, and expanding
the jurisdiction from the national to global.” Vaidhyanathan, supra note 25, at 101. See generally
Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999); Lawrence Lessig, The Future
of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (2001).
Heidegger, supra note 2, at 50.
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Rather, the concept is grounded in “Machiavellian scheming” and the pursuit of
power. “Calculative thinking computes. It computes ever new, ever more promising and at the same time more economical possibilities. Calculative thinking races
from one prospect to the next.”28 The threat Heidegger envisions to human thought
is even more dangerous than nuclear warfare.29
¶10 Heidegger’s threat is based on the separation of man from his or her
nature. By pursuing economic calculation, man is cut off from the transformative
powers of his or her environment. In such a world, law does not have the capacity
to educate or to provide the basis for social harmony;30 rather, like any resource,
law must be employed to more economic ends. The implication is that calculative
thinking mandates that everything (including law) be subjected to a single will.
While Heidegger recognized the danger of subjecting everything to a single will,
the issue of whether, and when, he equated the danger with Nazi totalitarianism,
which he had originally supported, would require a line of historical inquiry far
beyond the scope of this article.31 Regardless of Heidegger’s own political and
moral journey, Nazism effectively illustrates Heidegger’s philosophical fear—that
technological thinking risks the “ordering” of all the world, including humanity,
as resources subject to a singular will.

28.
29.

Id. at 46.
Id. at 52 (“[A]n attack with technological means is being prepared upon the life and nature of man
compared with which the explosion of the hydrogen bomb means little.”).
30. See infra ¶ 28.
31. One of the best treatments of the issue is Safranski’s critique of Heidegger’s responses to his famous
interview with Der Spiegel, which took place on September 23, 1964, in Freidenburg, but which
was not published until his death. See Rüdiger Safranski, Martin Heidegger: Between Good
and Evil 418–21 (Ewald Osers trans., 1998). Safranski believes Heidegger recognized that Nazism
had ultimately been guilty of technological reductionism, as used in this article (or reducing the
world, including men, to a resource for exploitation). See id. at 420 (footnote omitted) (“When the
interview turned to the problem that ‘technology tears men loose from the earth and uproots them,’
Heidegger pointed out that National Socialism had originally intended to oppose such a development
[technological reductionism] but had subsequently become its motor.”). In a review of The Heidegger
Controversy: A Critical Reader, Thomas Sheehan is much more skeptical of how far (and how soon)
Heidegger distanced himself from his initial embrace of Nazism. See Thomas Sheehan, A Normal
Nazi, N.Y. Rev. Books, Jan. 14, 1993, at 31.
Heidegger’s disillusionment had to do with the [Nazi] party’s failure to carry out Heidegger’s
own philosophical program of renewing the promise of the ancient Greek polis, overcoming
European nihilism, and returning Germany to a less hectic and more simple life. Thus his so
called “break” with official Nazism in the mid-Thirties consisted in his decision to be more true
to the “inner truth and greatness” of the movement than the party ever could be.
		 Id. at 35 (citing Ernst Nolte, Martin Heidegger, Politik und Geschicte im Leben und Denken
(Politics and History in his Life and Thought) 164–65 (1992)). For general discussion of
Heidegger and his affiliation with Nazism, see Safranski, supra; Sheehan, supra; Nolte, supra;
Johannes Fritsche, Historical Destiny and National Socialism in Heidegger’s Being and Time
(1999); Hugo Ott, Martin Heidegger: A Political Life (Allan Blunden trans., 1993); Hans Sluga,
Heidegger’s Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany (1993); Heidegger Controversy:
A Critical Reader (Richard Wolin ed., 1991).
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Subjection of Law to Will—The Nazi Experience
¶11 While serving as a law librarian at the University of Illinois at Urbana-

Champaign, I learned that a special mission of the Library of Congress had seized
contents of Nazi libraries following World War II. As part of a library lecture series,
Tom Kilton and Gail Hueting, university librarians from the Modern Languages
and Linguistics Library, discussed items seized by the Library of Congress and
distributed to various American libraries. Some of the items were held in various
University of Illinois campus libraries, but at the time of Kilton and Hueting’s
presentation, no one had looked seriously at the law school library. Motivated by
the lecture and with some effort, I was able to identify more than seventy such
items at the law library and many other legal titles that traced their origin to Nazi
Germany.32
¶12 As I made my way through some of the legal materials, I was struck by the
fact that the Nazis did not simply ignore law; rather, they systematically rewrote
it to their own purposes. For example, consider the following translation of a Nazi
business organizations statute:
The industrial concern of a legal person is considered as Jewish,
(a) if one or several of the persons appointed as legal representation or one or several
of the members of the supervisory board are Jews;
(b) if Jews are crucially involved as to capital or right to vote. Crucial participation
in capital occurs if more than one quarter of the capital belongs to Jews; crucial
participation as to right to vote occurs if the Jewish voices (voters) reach half of
the total number of voices (voters).33

The section then goes on to address issues of subsidiaries and mining enterprises.34
Having been a tax attorney in a former life, I am struck by the technical precision
and lengths to which Nazi draftsmen went to define “Jewish” business entities.
Technical definitions of “controlled groups” and “closely held” corporations illustrate similar precision in draftsmanship with respect to U.S. tax law, but without
the anti-Semitism.35 The Nazis, at least in 1934, did not simply ignore the law; they
reworked it with great care and precision to their own ends.
¶13 This was a Nazi legal academy, complete with law professors, some of
whom sported Nazi pins or armbands, who systematically set about to rewrite

32.

See Library Lines: A Reminder to Never Forget the Past, Ill. Jurist, Spring 2002, at 25–26; Gail
P. Hueting, Special Collections in German Studies in North American Libraries (rev. Feb.
1, 2005), http://www.dartmouth.edu/~wessweb/gdgspeccoll.html (Item no. 16, National Socialist
Literature, briefly describes the 17,000 volumes held by the University of Illinois as part of the
Cooperative Acquisitions Project for Wartime Publications.).
33. Heinrich Schönfelder, Deutsche Reichsgesetze Sammlung des Verfassungs, Gemein, Straf
und Verfahrensrechts für den Täglichen Gebrauch § 10a, art. 1, para. 1, subpara. III (13th ed.,
1943) (passage translated by author).
34. Id. at subpara. IV.
35. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 447(h), 1563 (2000).
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the law according to Nazi ideals.36 In a translated foreword to the Academy for
German Law Yearbook 1933/34, Dr. Hans Frank, director of the German Academy
of Justice, revealed his own “instrumental”37 attitudes about German law and legal
academia when he wrote:
Being entrusted with the Fuhrer’s call for the revision of the German empire’s legal system, . . . I have the Academy for German Justice, which shall demand the reorganization
of the German legal life in close and lasting conjunction with the proper authorities for the
legislation of the National Socialist program. . . .
. . . Germany has at its disposal the greatest jurist’s organization of the world, the Union
of National Socialist German Jurists, to set down a method of working, which differs
from the lawmaking of fundamental liberalist aims. In hardly any other area of life has
the parliamentary methods of the party state had a more fatal effect than in the field of the
lawmaking and legislation.38

In other words, the law was too important a tool to be entrusted to politicians.39
Both the law and legal academia were put to the service of the Nazi “machine.”
¶14 As Führer, Hitler was exalted to the status of a legal concept. In 1940, J.
Walter Jones (fellow of Queen’s College, Oxford) described the Führer as one of
two principles upon which the Nazi conception of law was based (the other principle being racial homogeneity).40 Having reviewed Nazi writings on the subject,
Jones observed:
The efficiency of all political and legal machinery is judged by the smoothness and speed
which it brings to the functioning of the Nation-State. Action, instant and overwhelming,
must be the primary purpose of the State. . . . Therefore, State action is dependent on the
existence of a Leader (Führer) and on unquestioning faith in the creed of leadership.41

This nice little syllogism justifies totalitarian rule on the basis of expedient state
action.
¶15 In June 1934, the same Dr. Hans Frank, then the Bavarian justice minister
as well as director of the Academy of German Justice, phoned Hitler to inquire

36.

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.

See, e.g., Akademie für Deutsches Recht, Jahrbuch 1936, at vi–vii, illus. ii (1936) (shows Dr.
Hans Frank in Nazi uniform as president of Academie für Deutsches Recht); id. at 144–45, illus.
vi (shows Dr. Karl Lasch, director of the Academie, sporting a Nazi lapel pin). Note that in 1937
Heidegger declined to attend with the German delegation a Descartes conference in France intended
as a forum to reconcile Nazi socialism with European philosophy. See Safranski, supra note 31, at
324–25. Many of the German academia wore Nazi uniforms. Id. at 325.
Throughout this article, I use “instrumental” in the same sense as Heidegger uses “technical” or
“calculative” to refer the reduction of law and legal information to “resources” to be ordered to some
end. See supra ¶¶ 3–5.
Hans Frank, Vorwort, in Akademie für Deutsches Recht, Jahrbuch 1933/34, at 5–6 (1934) (passage translated by author).
See id. at 5 (“Here, in the past, the former state’s anonymous playground accounted only to extracted
economic and political power groups.”) (passage translated by author).
See J. Walter Jones, The Nazi Conception of Law 4–5 (Oxford Pamphlets on World Affairs No.
21, 1939).
Id. at 5.
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about the “legal grounds” to carry out Hitler’s order to execute nineteen leaders
of the Brownshirts (the Röhm putsch), then being held in Frank’s care. Hitler’s
response: “I’ll tell you that the legal grounds for everything that happens is the
very existence of the Reich!”42 Being thoroughly converted to Hitler’s cause,
Dr. Frank would later declare, “[S]ince the foundation of the National Socialist
State is National Socialist law and order, the Supreme Führer is by definition also
our supreme judge . . . , that his will must now be the foundation of our law and
order.”43 The nightmare of the world as gasoline station was realized into the rule
of a single will.
¶16 Not surprisingly, Dr. Frank closed his telephone conversation with Hitler
by committing to carry out the executions;44 the German concept of order (in the
sense of laying the foundation of the Third Reich) demanded it. Later, as governor
of occupied Poland, Dr. Frank would extend the reasoning justifying nineteen
executions to seventeen thousand: “We must not be squeamish when we hear
of seventeen thousand Poles executed.”45 Dr. Frank, who began his career as a
defense attorney and then became a legal academic, would ultimately be convicted
at Nuremburg and hung for his actions as governor of occupied Poland.46
¶17 The point of this painful odyssey through Nazi law is to illustrate the
extremes to which law can be reduced to serve a chosen end and subjugated to
a single will. In the words of Dr. Hans Frank, “the Academy for German Law in
almost all important fields of law has supplied an abundance of valuable suggestions and contributions for the realization of the National Socialist legal will.”47 It
is to the realization of will that law ultimately succumbs when it is reduced to the
status of a technological tool by calculative thinking.
The Modern American Version—Law and the Billable Unit
¶18 In contemporary America, the technological yoking of law to will—its whole-

sale conversion to “standing reserve”—is infinitely less inimical and perceptible
than in Nazi Germany, but the danger is there, nonetheless. It is the subtle shift in
attitudes accompanying new legal technologies to which law librarians, and ultimately the legal profession, must direct their attention.
¶19 While describing an experimental system that seamlessly combines brief
writing on the word processor with legal research—to facilitate a kind of selfresearching brief—Dan Dabney, senior director, Thomson Global Services GmbH,
observed: “[W]hat is happening here, at least potentially, is that legal research has

42.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Niklas Frank, In the shadow of the Reich 85 (Arthur S. Wensinger & Carole Clew-Hoey trans.,
Knopf 1991) (1987) (Hans Frank’s son recounted the phone conversation in an impassioned biography condemning his father’s life and deeds as a jurist and Nazi officer.).
Id. at 71 (parenthetical comments of biographer omitted) (emphasis added).
Id. at 85.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 356–71.
Frank, supra note 38, at 6 (emphasis added).
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ceased to be a particularly separate part of the operation. You can just sit down and
write a brief and the authorities you need, the law that you are looking for, will
find you.”48 Dabney’s education as an information scientist is apparent. He quite
capably connects technological developments with search behavior.
¶20 More importantly, Dabney connects legal search behaviors with underlying attitudes about legal arguments. In fact, Dabney illustrates that the behavior
and attitudes this new self-researching brief facilitates are not new. He quotes a
former law partner: “You know when I write a brief, I do the legal research last. I
write the brief and when I see something that probably needs authority I just put
in ‘(cite)’ and go on and write something else. But you can make the argument
because you know what the arguments are going to be.”49 West’s new technology
is not to blame for this attitude. After all, the technology simply facilitates the calculative thinking and culture already at the root of the legal profession. West and
other publishers simply meet the demand for information services and products
to supply authority for the arguments legal practitioners have already decided to
make.
¶21 Dabney’s most interesting observation explores the philosophical underpinnings of such calculative attitudes:
[T]he reason that my colleague was so proud of this is that it reflected his rather cynical
attitude about the law itself. There is no sense in which the law informs you at all. You are
creating the law that was necessary to your purposes on the fly and you were never going to
discover that law wasn’t the way you wanted it to be. This [is], you know, the legal realist
mentality: There is plenty of law out there for everyone.50

The information environment facilitates the triumph of legal realism. Indeed,
Grant C. Gilmore made the argument back in 1961 that realism is a reaction of the
information environment to the presence of too many cases in the system.51
¶22 Even in the Anglo-American tradition, in the same society that triumphed
over Nazism and Fascism, the prevailing viewpoint is technological and calculative. Heidegger’s fears aptly criticized American capitalism as well as totalitarian
ideologies: “‘Calculation’ stands for Americanism, ‘planning’ for communism,
and ‘cultivation’ for National Socialism.”52 The labels differ, but the methods of
Western ideologies all share calculative thinking at their core.
¶23 Modern thinking about law is also calculative in nature. The principle of
flexible stability, that the “[l]aw must be stable and yet it cannot stand still,”53 the

48.

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Dan Dabney, Envisioning the Future: The Publisher’s Perspective, Remarks at the Future of Law
Libraries Symposium, Florida Coastal School of Law (Mar. 10–11, 2005), mms://broadcast.cali
.org/foll05/DanDabney.wmv (quoted passage transcribed by author).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037, 1041 (1961).
Safranski, supra note 31, at 296.
Pound, supra note 11, at 1.
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oft-recited declaration with which Roscoe Pound opens Interpretations of Legal
History and which is engraved above the moot courtroom at Cornell Law School,
facilitates predictability, economic growth, and the general welfare. While Pound’s
statement has been elevated to the status of a legal maxim, its underlying rationale
is less known. “The social interest in general security has led men to seek some
fixed bases for an absolute ordering of human action whereby a firm and stable
social order might be assured.”54 Again, the will to order drives modern, instrumental conceptions of law. Law is simply the basis for “ordering human action,”
although as Pound argues, the resulting construct must be flexible to be successful.
Heidegger’s description of technical and calculative thinking, based upon willing
order, corresponds nicely to this modern conception of law.
¶24 The conception of law is equally calculative and instrumental in nature in
the writings of other modern theorists. Ronald Dworkin’s paradigm of law as the
unending chain story also functions to maximize the values of stability and predictability.55 H.L.A. Hart, another luminary of jurisprudence, stresses law’s “value as
an instrument for the realization of human purposes.”56 Normative theories of law
and economics exult in the efficient administration of the general welfare.57 Noting
law’s instrumental character, Richard Posner comes closest to identifying the technological nature of law (in Heidegger’s sense), by arguing: “I myself do not think
law is a humanity. It is a technique of government.”58 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Sr.,
noted poet and father of the eminent United States Supreme Court Justice, also saw
law in a technical and instrumental context: “Law is an implement of society which
is intended for every-day work.”59 Holmes, Jr., while not using technical language,
commented on the historical origins of law in saying that “the earliest appearance
of law was as a substitute for the private feuds between families or clans.”60 In
sum, the modern, instrumental conception of law is clear. Law is fundamentally a
resource for stability in an unstable world. In Heidegger’s terms, law appears as
standing reserve—as something to be ordered, with the rest of the world to serve
some end.61 Small wonder that, in addition to Heidegger’s philosophical definition,

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

59.

60.
61.

Id. (emphasis added).
See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire 228–38 (1986).
H.L.A. Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, in 6 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy 264, 273 (Paul
Edwards ed., 1967).
See Eric Talley, Theory of Law and Economics, in Oxford Companion to American Law, supra note
12, at 485, 486.
Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 Va. L. Rev. 1351, 1392 (1986).
Posner admits that as a technique, law is “tied to the creation of and interpretation of texts” which
can benefit “from sympathetic engagement with literature,” at least on his terms. Id.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Pages from an Old Volume of Life 323 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin
1892 (second emphasis added). Holmes, Sr. continues: “It [law] is a coarse tool and not a mathematical instrument.” Id.
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 248 (Little, Brown & Co. 1923) (1881).
See supra note 6.
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standing reserve is used as an accounting concept for assessing resources in the
military and energy industries.62
¶25 Reducing law to standing reserve may seem unnecessarily perfunctory,
especially since it is hard to think of it in any other way. Indeed, the profession
of law speaks of legal information, like other information, as a resource to be
mined, harvested, ordered, quantified (in billable units), packaged, marketed, and,
ultimately, consumed to some calculated end or purpose, which in turn will serve
some other overarching end or purpose. A quick survey of product literature reinforces the commoditization of legal information and law:
l

l

l

l

l

“Try CQ Legislative Impact and you’ll see how this service can streamline
your work by pinpointing the exact places where pending legislation would
change existing laws.”63
Advertisement with photo of attorney in front of circus booth labeled
“Estrella’s Prophecies.” He asks, “How will my judge rule on this issue?” The
subtitle for the advertisement reads, “There’s a better way to get a real indication of how your judge might rule on a specific issue—strategic court-records
research on LexisNexis Courtlink.”64
“Draft high-quality, winning legal briefs, motions and pleadings faster and
more accurately with Shepard’s BriefCheck for the Web. . . .”65
“When you need an answer to the question, ‘Is my case good law?’ there’s
no question which system provides a more comprehensive or more focused
answer.”66
“Westlaw Litigator can help you in every aspect of your case and at every stage
of the process. It puts all your key litigation resources in one place to save you
time.”67

62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See, e.g., David Newbery, Electricity Liberalization in Britain and the Evolution of Market Design, in
Electricity Market Reform: An International Perspective 109, 120 (Fereidoon Perry Sioshansi
& Wolfgang Pfaffenberger eds., 2006) (illustrating concept of energy reserves); M. Rashidinejad, Y.H.
Song, & M.H. Javidi, Ancillary Services (I): Pricing and Procurement of Reserves, in Operation
of Market-oriented Power Systems 223 (Yong-Hua Song & Xi-Fan Wang eds., 2003) (illustrating concept of energy reserves); Carlos Pascual, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction &
Stabilization, U.S. Dep’t of State, Strengthening U.S. Reconstruction and Stabilization Capabilities,
Address Before Joint Event of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and Woodrow
Wilson International Center for Scholars (Oct. 20, 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/s/crs/
rls/rm/37430.htm (discussing role of foreign service supporting military through rotating through
“Standing Reserve”).
Letter from Congressional Quarterly, Inc. (undated ca. 2006) (copy on file with author).
LexisNexis advertisement, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2005, at 7 (“Revealing court-records research is just one
way LexisNexis gives litigators a strategic advantage, often before their case ever gets to trial.”).
New Shepard’s BriefCheck for the Web: More Cite-Checking Accuracy Plus Web Flexibility, 6
LexisNexis Info. Prof. Update 93 (2006).
Lexis Auto-Cite advertisement, A.B.A. J., August 1991, at 45 (“When it comes to building strong
cases, there’s strength in numbers [of precedent]”).
Westlaw Litigator advertisement, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2004, at 3.
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“Only ALR gives you the assurance you haven’t missed any case law on your
point.”68
“In addition to finding the primary law, you can check your firm’s legal arguments against those of the legal profession’s heavy hitters.”69
“Thanks to KeyCite and Table of Authorities, you can relax knowing that
nothing affecting the precedential value of a cited authority will escape your
notice.”70

The common theme from the vendor literature is simple: legal information
resources are essential tools which make the practice of law more efficient. They
proffer competitive advantage and a sense of security, while putting the law at
users’ fingertips so that nothing is missed. In Heidegger’s terms, the resources
bring law into the order of standing reserve. As Dabney has pointed out,71 law
appears to have the same characteristics as the information services that provide
access to it because through such systems the law always stands ready to supply
argument for any occasion or proposition. The question is how to think otherwise.
More importantly, has Heidegger’s nightmare of the world as a “gasoline station”
been realized?

Daring to Think Otherwise—“In-formative” Reading
¶26 Dabney’s use of inform (as in “there is no sense in which the law informs you”)

is both interesting and entirely consistent with his behavioral approach, including
conceptual linkages to legal realism. Information evolved from the Latin informare
as in “the action of forming matter, such as stone, wood, leather, etc.,” or, with
respect to informing humans, “the action of informing; formation or molding of
the mind or character, training, instruction, teaching; communication of instructive
knowledge.”72 To inform was transformative of character in respect to material
objects or the human mind and character. Following World War II, however, there
was a shift to a more technical or calculating meaning of the term information
(consistent with Heidegger’s sense of the term) to “define anything that was sent
over an electric or mechanical channel.”73 In 1949, information science pioneers
Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver defined information as “that which reduces
uncertainty.”74 With its utility established, information is now a proper “resource.”
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Lawyers Cooperative Publishing advertisement for American Law Reports (ALR), A.B.A. J., July
1991, at 15.
Tim Nixon, How Online Briefs Save Time, Law. Librs. New Millennium, May–Jun. 2004, at 7 (commenting on West’s Online Briefs).
Jay Shuck, WestCheck Meets the World Wide Web, Law. Librs. New Millennium, Mar.–Apr. 2004,
at 5.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
Richard Saul Wurman, Information Anxiety 38 (1989).
Id.
Id. at 39 (citing Claude Shannon & Warren Weaver, Mathematical Theory of Communication
(1949)).
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Being dedicated to “reducing uncertainty,” information bears remarkable relationship to order, or ordering, and fits easily with Heidegger’s concept of “standing
reserve.”
¶27 The same is true of law. As discussed earlier, legal information reduces
uncertainty by providing access to a stable system of rules for resolving disputes
in a predictable way.75 In short, law is perhaps the principle tool for ordering our
world. It is no surprise that the law is often made up of “ord-inance” (deriving
from order).76 Indeed, the German gesetz, translated as law, also means “to place”
as in “to set down order.”77 Returning to legal information, the major legal publishers facilitate this ordering in a remarkable way, with “Exhibit A” being West’s
Topic and Key Number system.
¶28 The interpretation of information as a tool for reducing order, however,
contrasts with the sense that Dabney may have meant for the term inform, in its
pre-war, non-technological sense, as information informing the reader. It is the
individual user’s understanding and character that is formed, molded, and educated. It is in this sense that Isocrates and Plato referred to law. “Isocrates claims
that proliferation of laws and the search for akribeia (precision) [perhaps another
reference to order] was to miss the real function of law, which was to be general
and morally educative.”78 Plato shared a similar vision with respect to law serving an instructional function and promoting social harmony. “Laws are partly
framed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them how they may live on
friendly terms with one another, and partly for the sake of those who refuse to be
instructed, whose spirit cannot be subdued, or softened, or hindered from plunging
into evil.”79 Plato’s analogy of philosophy curing the ills of the soul as a doctor
applies medicine to a sick patient is particularly apt here.80 “[J]ustice is a moral
physician and cures men of their excesses and makes them better people.”81 This
is the original sense of legal information, which stresses in-forming or educating
and molding members of society.
¶29 While browsing a well-known rare book store in Salt Lake City, I happened
upon a 1633 third edition of Lord Edward Coke’s First Part of the Institutes of the
Laws of England (otherwise known as the Coke’s Commentary on Littleton),82
75.
76.
77.
78.

79.
80.
81.
82.

See supra notes 53–71 and accompanying text.
See Oxford English Dictionary Online (Draft Revision Sept. 2004), http://dictionary.oed.com
(access etymology link for “ordinance, n.”).
See id. (2d ed. 1989) (access etymology link for “law, n.”).
S.C. Todd, The Language of Law in Classical Athens, in The Moral World of the Law 17, 27
(Peter Coss ed., 2000) (citing Isocrates §§ 7.33, 7.39-40). See also Paul D. Callister, Law’s Box: Law,
Jurisprudence and the Information Ecosphere, 74 UMKC L. Rev. 263, 277–78 (pointing out the
advantages of Stelae as a medium for education through law).
5 Plato, Dialogues of Plato 266 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 3d ed., rev. and corrected, N.Y. and
London, MacMillan & Co. 1892).
Plato, Gorgias 69–71 (W. Hamilton trans., Penguin Books 1960).
Id. at 70.
Edward Coke, First Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England (3d ed. corrected, London,
M.F.I.H. & R.T. assigns of I. More, esq., 1633).
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which I acquired for my law school. The volume is particularly valuable because of
the marginalia, evidence of provenance, and other inscriptions, including one from
the cover sheet bearing a quote in Latin from Quintilian from the first century A.D.
This quotation reveals something about the relationship of the reader to the text.
“Those who strive to reach the heights will always rise higher than those who, giving up on their goals because of despair, immediately halt at the lowest levels.”83
It is not a testimonial about the ease and usefulness of the book, or its utility as a
resource; rather, it emphasizes the journey, which the reader must undertake, and
the transformation that is the ultimate reward of the book.
¶30 Frederick C. Hicks, whose legacy as a legal bibliographer and teacher
is dear to the law library profession, recognized the difficulty readers had with
Coke’s monumental work, writing that this “‘painful volume’ has become a symbol for all books which, sparing neither author nor reader in going to the bottom
of things, say the last on the subjects of which they treat.”84 Fundamentally, the
prominent legal texts in earlier times bore a different relationship to readers and
students than the legal information resources of today. Prior texts emphasized informing the student. Modern texts are more easily accessed, perused, and searched
in both print and digital (including convenient “cut-and-paste”) formats.
¶31 This modern change in the relationship of readers to legal texts is demonstrated in Otto Preminger’s film, Anatomy of a Murder.85 In the film, which
explores the insanity defense, or “irresistible impulse,” the lawyer for the defense,
Paul Biegler, played by Jimmy Stewart, does something incomprehensible in the
modern practice of law. Biegler and his alcoholic colleague, Parnell McCarthy,
played by Arthur O’Connell, actually choose to spend their leisure time drinking bourbon whiskey and reading case reporters—decisions by Justice Holmes
no less.86 For a practicing lawyer to find recreation in reading case reporters, let
alone spend significant time to ponderously read cases under any circumstances
(while tippling with a colleague), probably strikes most present-day attorneys as
anachronistic, if not an outright Hollywood fabrication.87

83.

84.
85.
86.
87.

Translation of handwritten inscription from dedication page of UMKC law library’s copy of Coke’s
Institutes. See id. The inscription comes from Quintilian’s Institutio Oratoria and reads: “Altius ibunt
qui ad summa nitentur quam qui praesumpta desperatione qua velint evadendi protinus circa ima
substiterint.” E-mail from Holly M. Sypniewski, Assistant Professor, Department of Classical Studies,
Millsaps College, to Elisabeth Bach-Van Horn, Legal Research Assistant, UMKC School of Law
(Aug. 16, 2006). See 1 Institutio Oratoria of Quintilian 14–15 (bk. I preface, l. 20) (E. Capps,
T.E. Page, & W.H.D. Rouse eds., H.E. Butler trans., London, William Heinemann 1920) (n.d.).
Frederick C. Hicks, Men and Books Famous in the Law 97 (1921).
Anatomy of a Murder (Columbia Pictures 1959).
Id. (McCarthy queries Biegler: “Well, what shall we read this evening? How about a little Chief
Justice Holmes?”).
The 1959 movie is based on a book of the same title by John D. Voelker (writing under the name of
Robert Traver) originally published in 1958, when Voelker was a justice of the Michigan Supreme
Court. He served from 1957 to 1959, when he retired to write full time after the success of Robert
Traver, Anatomy of a Murder (1958).
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¶32 As unusual as the behavior of the fictional attorneys in Anatomy of a
Murder may seem, there was indeed a time when reading (other than the condensed
and heavily edited versions presented in the classroom) was dear to the profession.
Robert C. Berring has noted that “Daniel Webster probably read every case that
was published by every American appellate court, and probably read English cases
as well.”88 In 1769, another model American, John Rutledge wrote a telling letter
to his brother Edward, then studying law in England. The letter advises:
[W]ith regard to particular law books—Coke’s Institutes seem to be almost the foundation
of our law. These you must read over and over, with the greatest attention, and not quit
him till you understand him thoroughly, and have made your own everything in him, which
is worth taking out. . . . I would read every case reported from that time [the Glorious
Revolution of 1688] to the present [1769]. . . . I would have you, also, read the Statute
Laws throughout . . . . When I say you should read such a book, I do not mean just to run
cursorily through it, as you would a newspaper but to read it carefully and deliberately, and
transcribe what you find useful in it.89

Both John and Edward Rutledge would serve as delegates to the General Congress
prior to the American Revolution and later as governors of South Carolina. Edward
Rutledge would sign the Declaration of Independence, and John would serve as a
Justice on the United States Supreme Court and chief justice of the South Carolina
Supreme Court.90 Other examples of equally prodigious readers of American law
are easy to find.91
¶33 Reading was at the heart of an English and early American legal education,
and not just perusing, but a painstaking, purposefully repetitive and comprehensive study of works (as of 1769, eighty-one years of cases), including extensive
personal annotation and transcribed notes. So voracious was the reading of the
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century bar that courts justified selecting decisions for publication (rather than publishing every decision) to help cut down the
reading. “The leading lawyers in every State are expected to run over, if they do
not read, every case in every new volume of its reports. Every case dropped [from
publication] lightens the task.”92 Indeed, law was a profession of readers. But why?
Was it simply a matter of being the best armed for court or was something deeper
and nobler going on?
¶34 The very essence of being a lawyer was to be bookish. In a delightful

88.
89.
90.
91.

92.

Robert C. Berring, Collapse of the Structure of the Legal Research Universe: The Imperative of
Digital Information, 69 Wash. L. Rev. 9, 19 (1994).
John Belton O’Neall, 2 Biographical Sketches of the Bench and Bar of South Carolina
124–26 (Charleston, S.G. Courtenay & Co. 1859).
On John Rutledge, see 1 id. at 17–37; on Edward Rutledge, see 2 id. at 115–29.
See, e.g., Moorfield Storey & Edward W. Emerson, Ebenezer Rockwood Hoar 30 (1911) (Hoar
served as a supreme court justice for Massachusetts); Address of Hon. Henry W. Blodgett upon
the Early Bar of Chicago 7 (1896) (discussing reading habits of Illinois State Supreme Court
Justice John Dean Canton).
Simeon E. Baldwin, American Judiciary 274 (1905).
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article published in 1937, Max Radin explained the effect on modern legal scholarship of the seventeenth-century work of Sir Edward Coke on the basis of its
grounding in books.93 However, the purpose of such reading is best understood
from Lord Coke himself. Coke’s writings go beyond “making the case” to include
something more beneficial, such as informing the reader and improving individual
self-governance in accordance with law. Coke quotes Parliament about the reason
for publishing his magnum opus, the Laws and Institutes, in English, rather than
in the customary legal French:
That the Lawes and Customes of this Realme the rather should be reasonably perceived and
knowne, and better understood by the tongue used in this Realme, and by so much every
man might the better governe himselfe without offending the Law. . . . [G]ood governance
and full right is done to every man, because that the Lawes and Customes be learned and
used in the Tongue of the Country: as more at large by the said Act. . . . No man ought to
be wiser than the Law.94

The highest purpose of publishing law is so that individuals may better govern
themselves.
¶35 The moral essence and transformative character of law books are evidenced
in several ways. Early English judges and attorneys apparently elected to read
Littleton’s Tenures each Christmas.95 Together with the Bible, such books came
to represent individual conscience. In 1648, during the Interregnum, Judge David
Jenkins was accused before the House of Commons of being a Royalist. In prospect of hanging, the judge found strength in his books: “Multitudes, no doubt, will
come to see the old Welsh Judge hanged. I shall go with the venerable Bracton’s
book hung on my left shoulder, and the Statutes at Large on my right. I will have
the Bible, with a ribbon put round my neck, hanging on my breast.”96 The symbolic
moral force that an English judge placed upon the Bible, Bracton, and the Statutes
belies a reverence to legal bibliography alien to the modern practice of law.
¶36 The law itself at various times in history has functioned as a transformative
agent, not simply as another instrument or resource for ordering the world. While
this topic could be sufficiently addressed only in an article exclusively devoted
to that purpose, a few examples are in order. The thirteenth-century Charter of
Kurukan Fuga (forming the Empire of Mali), as kept by oral tradition, provides
for the division of classes, rules for collective escheat, transfer of property, fixing
dowry, and similar matters, but also for positive relations among family members, avoidance of vanity, respect for seniority, tolerance for religious beliefs,

93.
94.
95.

96.

Max Radin, On Legal Scholarship, 46 Yale L. J. 1124, 1127 (1937).
Coke, supra note 82, at vi.
2 Westminster Hall or Professional Relics and Anecdotes of the Bar, Bench, and Woolsack
8 (London, John Knight & Henry Lacey 1825) (describing Roger North as the model law student); see
also Gilbert J. Clark, 2 Life Sketches of Eminent Lawyers: American, English, and Canadian
101 (Kansas City, Lawyer’ International Co. 1895); Hicks, supra note 84, at 95.
William Ralph Douthwaite, Gray’s Inn: Its History & Associations 213 (London, Reeves &
Turner 1886).
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protection of foreigners, minimization of offenses against women, joking among
classes, and description of ideal leadership.97 In the charter, there is little of the
division between legal and normative standards that modern legal practitioners
and theorists would recognize. This ancient African law functioned in a way that
transformed individuals by encouraging tolerance, respect, leadership, diversity,
virtue, and even humor.
¶37 Also drawing from Africa, the Egyptian Demotic Code of Hermopolis
West (dating from about 730 to 15 B.C. in the Twenty-Fourth Dynasty) is in the
same tradition as both Egyptian wisdom literature and the narrative classic, the
“Tale of the Eloquent Peasant.”98 In Europe, the ancient Celts lacked a clear separation between legal maxim and aphorism or gnomic literature,99 intimating that a
common tradition functioned both to resolve disputes and to instruct character. In
classical Greece, Plato’s Laws suggest that “solemn custom often prevails over that
of statute.”100 Indeed, “custom as promulgated orally in the medium of Homer’s
Iliad is an interweaving of both private and public codes of conduct.”101 Thus,
Homer’s classic works may be as apt a source for law as any statute, and probably
much more transformative in effect.
¶38 A quick survey of ancient Anglo-Saxon legal traditions suggests that law
functioned merely as an efficient mechanism for administering punishments and
avoiding violence,102 much as Holmes, Jr. had noted.103 However, the curious title
of the fourteenth-century code of customary law, known as the Sachsenspiegel
(translated “Saxon Mirror”), suggests the need for much deeper understanding.
The mirror genre examines the metaphysical and intellectual dimensions of subjects such
as virtue, law, and rulership. Such mirrors, written in Latin, informed and instructed the
next generation. Eike’s lawbook [Der Sachsenspiegel] fits this tradition, but, significantly, it
also marks the first such instructional prose text to appear in the vernacular. Eike borrowed

97.

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

103.

See Mangoné Niang, The Kukukan Fuga Charter: An Example of an Endogeus Governance
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention 6–8 (2006) (working document prepared for Sahel and West
Africa Club/OECD, Inter-generational Forum on Endogenous Governance in West Africa, Workshop
No. 2, June 26–28, 2006), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/60/55/37341473.pdf (articles
1–4 (social classes), 7 (tolerance among relations), 14 (offense of women), 22 (vanity), 24 (treatment
of foreigners), 29 (dowrey), 32 (acquiring property), 33 (escheat), and 43 (joking)); see also Fatou
K. Camara, Democracy in a Plural Society: The Charter of Kurukan Fuga (Empire of Mali-1235)
(slides of presentation at Salzburg Seminar, Session 435: The Rule of Law: Reconciling Religion and
Culture in a Constitutional Framework, Oct. 9, 2006) (copy on file with author) (slides 8 (qualities of
leadership) and 9 (religious tolerance)).
See Callister, supra note 78, at 293–94.
Id. at 319–20.
Eric A. Havelock, Preface to Plato 63 (1963).
Callister, supra note 78, at 279 (citing Havelock, supra note 100, at 76).
See generally The Laws of the Earliest English Kings (F.L. Attenborough ed. and trans., 1922);
Laws of the Salian and Ripuarian Franks (Theodore John Rivers trans., 1986). Similar comparisons can be made with other tribes of northern Europe. See The Old West Frisian Skeltana Riucht
(Sydney Fairbanks trans., 1939); Laws of Early Iceland: Grágás, the Codex Regius of Grágás,
with Material from Other Manuscripts (Andrew Dennis et al. trans., 1980).
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
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the concept from the well-known twelfth-century mirror, Honorius Augustodunensis’s
Speculum ecclesiae, in which the Bride of Christ looks in a mirror to find those faults in
herself that might be objectionable to Christ.104

In other words, the Saxon law, despite the plethora of rules and penalties permitting resolution of disputes is fundamentally meant as text for the populace, in the
vernacular, so that they might better measure themselves. It is law that is informative in nature.
¶39 Thus, it is possible to think about law and legal information as something
other than resources for efficient exploitation. Not so long ago, even the modern
study of law carried transformative impact. Law books were even worthy of perusal
during one’s leisure time, to be read out loud while sipping drinks with friends
after working hours. Legal texts were the kind of reading one recommended to a
friend or a close sibling, with the expectation that the literary adventure, although
difficult, would exalt one’s thinking and character. Legal education was a lifelong
quest—the kind of journey that produced giants worthy of drafting constitutions
and governing nations. It is indeed possible to think differently about law and legal
institutions.

Prologue to Future Law Librarianship—
Dealing with Obsolescence
¶40 As the opening quotation suggests,105 the emergence of information technolo-

gies has threatened modern librarianship with obsolescence, or at least the perception of obsolescence. Because of law’s traditional dependence on highly structured
repositories of legal information, the threat applies as well to law and legal thinking. Law can be thought of as a resource to be harnessed, exploited, and ultimately
rendered obsolete. “[N]ever send to know for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for
thee.”106 The fates of libraries and law are intertwined, predicated on a worldview
that reduces their status, along with everything else, to being mere resources, suitable for exploitation. This outcome is not foreordained, however. The fundamental
aim of every law library ought to be to remind its patrons and constituents to dare
to think otherwise—to see the law in its true, transformative essence. If law librarians do not play this important role, the battle may be lost entirely.
¶41 In fall 2004, I participated in the Salzburg Seminar, Libraries in the
Twenty-First Century. A product of the conference was a statement titled “Vision
of the Communal Role of Libraries.” It emphasizes the role of libraries as cultural
institutions.

104.

Introduction, in The Saxon Mirror: A Sachsenspiegel of the Fourteenth Century 7–8 (Maria
Dobozy trans., 1999).
105. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
106. John Donne, Devotions XVII, in John Donne: Selected Poetry and Prose 165, 166 (T.W. Craik &
R.J. Craik eds., 1986).
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The library is a place where knowledge and information freely dwell to define, empower,
preserve, challenge, connect, entertain, and transform individuals, cultures, and communities. The dwelling place, whether physical or virtual, is the product of collective reflection,
aspiration, commitment, expertise and organization. It is both a byproduct of civil communities and a catalyst for cultural progress, inspiration, expression and exchange. Its absence
in this new century would not only deprive many individuals of important resources, but
also, more significantly, such loss would deny humanity an essential portion of its shared
identity and entitled liberties. The library can never be fully replaced by information
technologies. For the essence of its communal role is not the technological mastery over
knowledge and information, but rather the provision of sanctuary for human thought and
expression in any medium.107

The statement is intended to counter perceptions of libraries as obsolete resources
and emphasizes the role of libraries as cultural institutions. Of particular importance is the library’s role in defining and enabling communities and in serving as a
transformative institution and sanctuary for human thought and character. Despite
their unique features, the same statement applies equally well to law libraries.
¶42 In conclusion, let me suggest that the legal academy and librarians can
think about law libraries in ways that will avoid reducing the library to a mere set
of technologies or resources, in Heidegger’s sense, and will facilitate recognition
of the library’s larger role as a cultural and transformative institution:
¶43 Library as Portal to the World. Besides the pragmatic recognition that
many libraries serve more virtual visitors than physical patrons, the library must
serve as a window to a wider world, allowing patrons access to unfamiliar places
and ideas.
¶44 Library as Social Knowledge Network. An organization’s principle value
is not its physical assets, but what the organization “knows”—including both the
information it accesses and stores and the collective knowledge, wisdom, and
social relationships of the organization’s members (in this case the knowledge,
skill, and relationships of the librarians).
¶45 Library as Transforming User Behavior and Character. The transformative impact of a library on its users and constituents is a prime justification for its
continued existence. Not only should improving research skills and information
literacy drive much of a library’s effort, but it must also emphasize its impact on
the overall character and education of its users. Consequently, it will never do for
law libraries simply to “train” students in legal research skills.108
¶46 Library as Transformative and Communal Place. As addressed in the
Salzburg statement, the law library provides sanctuary for human thought and
expression and serves an important role in defining the respective cultures of the

107.

Vision of the Communal Role of Libraries (endorsed Mar. 31, 2005, by the Faculty, Fellows, and
Observers of the Salzburg Seminar, Libraries in the 21st Century), http://www1.law.umkc.edu/
faculty/callister/Session422/statement.pdf.
108. For extensive discussion on the theme of training versus education in the context of legal research
instruction, see generally Callister, supra note 14.
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law schools and legal profession. It is a temple to which patrons may withdraw
from the world, if only for a brief moment, to reorient their moral compasses,
reflect on their ideals, remember who they are, and discover the entirely unexpected (including the intellectual and moral fiber at the heart of the profession).
¶47 In closing, remember the noble character of libraries and the transformative power of law. These twin, glorious institutions represent far more than
resources for human consumption, subjugation, and exploitation. It is not simply
the futures of libraries and legal professions that are at stake, but the underpinnings
of civilization and the continuing tenure of the rule of law.

